A Novel Approach for Security Analysis using Shift Factors for Limited Synchrophasor Observability by Abu-Jaradeh, Backer & Beshir, Mohammed





University of Southern California  
abujarad@usc.edu                    
                     Mohammed Beshir 







The adoption of synchrophasor technology has 
increased rapidly in the past decade. Many system 
operators have made synchrophasor applications 
available to operators, to reveal hidden operating 
conditions, and increase grid resiliency. The 
development of Linear State Estimation provided an 
innovative method to solve system states linearly at a 
faster rate, and serve as a backup to EMS should the 
conventional State Estimator fail to solve. Advanced 
applications were developed to take advantage of LSE 
solution to provide operators with alternative 
contingency analysis applications using 
synchrophasors data [6]. However, currently explored 
applications are presumed to run iteratively every 
couple of minutes, and therefore not taking advantage 
of high resolution of measurements available in 
synchrophasors. This work proposes a method to 
monitor system limits by leveraging linearization 
methods for contingency analysis, to better utilize the 
benefits of synchrophasors. Also, a practical approach 
is proposed to handle lack of full observability, to 
ensure tool operability with the industry infrastructure.  
 1. Introduction  
The increase in load demand and the limited 
upgrades to transmission systems are pushing power 
systems to operate closer to their reliability boundaries, 
which may cause unforeseen operating conditions 
leading to cascading outages, uncontrolled system 
separation, or even blackouts. Therefore, the modern 
operation of the power grid requires continuous 
monitoring of System Operating Limits for normal and 
outage conditions, to ensure the reliable and secure 
operation of the system. Tools such as Real-Time 
Contingency Analysis (RTCA) are becoming a critical 
component of the modern power system operations 
environment to provide operators with the outlook 
necessary to guarantee that the system is operated within 
its pre-set boundaries should unforeseen outages 
happen. Power systems are becoming heavily dependent 
on advanced applications to reveal system conditions 
that were once unobservable by operators. Energy 
Management Systems (EMS) are equipped with 
comprehensive applications nowadays to help operators 
monitor the health of the grid, and even observe areas of 
the system that are not metered. State Estimator (SE) is 
an application within EMS that uses SCADA 
measurements and an iterative non-linear engine to 
provide downstream applications with a fully 
observable error-free system snapshot, for system 
monitoring and analysis. State Estimation is resource 
intensive by nature given the necessity to solve an 
optimization problem in an iterative fashion, which 
requires substantial amount of time to solve. Real-time 
network applications such as Real-Time Contingency 
Analysis use State Estimator solved powerflow cases to 
conduct iterative analysis to foresee system conditions 
should unscheduled outages occur in the power system. 
Real-Time Contingency Analysis usually handles 
thousands of contingencies, which is also resource 
intensive and time exhausting. In addition, typical 
RTCA runs iteratively every 3-5 minutes, and provides 
a list of potential violations for any possible 
contingency. Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) 
enabled Linearization of the State Estimation problem, 
leading to the development of Linear State Estimator 
(LSE). LSE algorithms are presented in [1][4-10]. LSE 
provides solution at synchrophasor rate, which allows 
more visibility to the power grid as compared to 
conventional State Estimation [1][4-5]. With access to 
more system snapshots through Linear State Estimation, 
synchrophasor measurements can be used to enhance 
RTCA by filling in the gaps in the solutions using 
SCADA-based applications. This work investigates 
methods for using synchrophasor-based technology, 
vetted by Linear State Estimator to provide higher-
resolution results for Security Analysis, to reveal not 
only violations at multi-minute interval, but also 





dynamics of violations at synchrophasor rate. This work 
addresses practical considerations regarding system 
observability, which is driven by PMU deployments, 
and proposes a solution to overcome limitations caused 
by limited PMU coverage.  
2. Use of Linear Shift Factors (LSFs) 
Real-Time contingency analysis requires solving 
iterative powerflow equations for thousands of system 
topological scenarios to reveal potential exceedances to 
System Operating Limits (SOLs) following 
unscheduled loss of equipment in real-time. Multiple 
approaches have been proposed to perform security 
analysis using synchrophasor measurements [2]. 
However, these methods suggest a contingency analysis 
that runs iteratively over a multi-minute window, like 
SCADA-based applications. Although such 
applications might provide a backup solution to existing 
contingency analysis applications should they fail in 
real-time, they disregard the benefit of high-resolution 
measurement availability in synchrophasor data. 
Synchrophasors offer synchronized phasor 
measurements at rates of at least 30 samples per second 
(for 60 Hz systems), which allow monitoring of system 
dynamics and transients. Linear Shift Factors (LSF) 
provide a linear estimation to the security analysis 
problem, which allow much faster calculations as 
compared to solving powerflow iteratively [12]. Shift 
Factors are constants that can be used to estimate the 
powerflow on a specific transmission equipment, 
knowing the power on another. Two types of Linear 
shift factors are well studied in literature [3][12]; Power 
Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) and Line Outage 
Distribution Factors (LODFs). Power Transfer 
Distribution Factor is the change in power flow on a 
transmission line relative to a power transfer between  
two buses (injection and withdrawal of power at two 
buses). [12]. PTDFs have the following mathematical 
definition: 
                                𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏,𝑙𝑙 =  
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏
𝛥𝛥 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏
,                   (1) 
Where, 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏,𝑙𝑙 = Power Transfer Distribution Factor for 
Line 𝑙𝑙, given an injection and withdrawal 
at buses a and b respectively.   
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏 = Change in Line 𝑙𝑙 power flow for the 
transaction at buses a and b.  
𝛥𝛥 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏  = Power transferred in from bus a to bus b 
Line Outage Distribution Factors are constants that 
represent the estimated change of power on a 
transmission line or a transformer relative to a loss of 
another line [12]. Like PTDFs, LODF are defined as 
follows: 
                                𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 =  
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0
,                            (2) 
Where, 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 = Line Outage Distribution Factor for Line 𝑙𝑙, 
after the contingency of Line 𝑐𝑐 
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 = Change in Line 𝑙𝑙 power flow following the 
contingency of Line 𝑐𝑐 
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0 = Power flow of contingency element 𝑐𝑐 before it was 
removed 
3. Security Analysis Using Shift Factors 
The objective of the proposed methodology is to 
provide real-time operators and engineers with fast real-
time security analysis that uses synchrophasor 
measurements and Linear State Estimation results. 
Synchrophasor measurements provide accurate and fast 
measurements to voltage and current phasors, which can 
be used to provide accurate contingency analysis results. 
However, the relatively low number of synchrophasors 
available from the grid makes it challenging to observe 
the real-time state of the whole system, even when 
violations are localized to a relatively small electrical 
area. The deployment of PMUs has been focused on key 
substations of the transmission grid, such as heavily 
interconnected substations, or stations with intertie 
lines, without much deployment in locations to 
optimally target full system observability. In addition, 
with synchrophasors focusing on wide area monitoring 
and situational awareness, the deployment of PMUs has 
been spread out in the transmission systems. This paper 
describes a practical method to use Linear Shift Factors 
with a limited available PMU coverage in the system, to 
estimate and monitor System Operating Limits 
exceedances at the synchrophasor rate. Figure 1 below 
represents a generic 5-bus power system, which will be 
used to explain the methodology proposed in this paper.  
 
Figure 1. Generic 5-Bus Power System 
 
Table 1 below shows the line loading information 
for all transmission lines in the case. For this example, 
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we will attempt to estimate the post-contingency line 
flows for all lines, following the loss of line 2-3. PTDFs 
for all lines relative to the injection/withdrawal of power 
at buses 2 and 4 respectively are also shown.   Buses 2 
and 4 represent the main source and sink of the system, 
which in result will derive the highest PTDFs set for all 
major lines. Also, LODFs for all lines are provided for 
the contingency of line 2-3. 
 
Table 1. MW, PTDFs for transaction between buses 
2 and 4, and LODFs of the outage of line 2-3 
𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  % 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2,4,𝑙𝑙 %𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,2−3 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,2−3 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
1-2 79  -17.14%  -33.3% 60.02  
1-3 62.14  17.14% 33.3% 80.98  
2-3 57.16  28.57% -100% 0  
2-4 52.35  36.19% 44.4% 77.31  
2-5 111.27  18.10% 22.2% 123.65  
3-4 -27.7  45.71% -66.7% -66.02  
4-5 16.13  18.10% -22.2% 3.35  
 
With all the powerflow information readily 
available, we can use LODFs to estimate the post-
contingency flow on Line 𝑙𝑙 following the loss of 
transmission line 𝑘𝑘 using the below equation [12] : 
 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 =  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙0 +  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0                  (3) 
Where, 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 is the power flow on Line 𝑙𝑙 after the removal 
of Line 𝑐𝑐 
Estimations of the post-contingency line flows for 
the loss of Line 2-3 are presented in table 1 as well. 
Figure 2 presents the actual MW flow of the line 
following the contingency. The results agree with the 
estimated results as expected. 
 
 
Figure 2. Simulation of the loss of Line 2-3 on the 5-
bus generic case in Figure 1 
 
For real-time applications implementation, 
equation (3) can be fed with real-time measurements 
continuously to update the post-contingency flow at the 
synchrophasor rate, and provide an updated outlook to 
system operators on the monitored SOL, without the 
need to continuously solve full powerflow. 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and 
𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 represent the real-time measurement of the 
limiting element (monitored element) and the 
contingency element prior to the loss of the line 
respectively.  Therefore, the linear equation above can 
be used to estimate the post-contingency line flow for 
any transmission line, given the flow-measurement 
availability of the limiting and contingency elements. 
To apply that, equation (3) becomes, 
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 =  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
0 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
0              (4) 
Where 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 denotes to the updated measurement for the 
line flow, as compared to the original flow from the 
solved powerflow.  
The challenge of making use of LODFs with 
synchrophasor measurements resides in the lack of 
availability of PMUs at every substation of the system 
to provide full observability, that is necessary to solve 
the linear equations. This means that 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙0𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 and 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐
0
𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛   
in equation (4) (the updated limiting and contingency 
elements flow measurements) might not be always 
available. Therefore, a practical methodology needs to 
be implemented to provide awareness for all 
contingencies and limiting elements, given the lack of 
measurement availability.  
It is assumed that measurements at much lower 
rates are available from EMS or State Estimator cases 
through conventional methods. Since most State 
Estimators run at a rate of at least once every 5 minutes, 
a value for unobservable PMU locations is available as 
a reference, which is used as a reference flow, and 
updated using synchrophasor measurements. And since 
this value is used as a reference and gets updated with 
new measurements, it is referred to as 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜. 
Let us define a new sensitivity factor called Line Flow 
Distribution Factor (LFDF), that is derived from two 
lines PTDFs as the following, 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 =  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏,𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏,𝑘𝑘
,                            (4) 
Substituting (1) into (4) gives, 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 =  
𝛥𝛥 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏
𝛥𝛥 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏
,                            (5) 
From this equation, it can be observed that the 
relationship between the change of flow on two lines is 
constant and does not depend on the power injected in 
the power transfer transaction. Therefore, if line 𝑙𝑙 is not 
observed, we can use equation 5 to estimate the change 
in flow on Line 𝑙𝑙 using another observed Line 𝑘𝑘. 
Rewriting equation (5), and dropping the transaction 
index, we get,  
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 =  𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 ,                                                    (5) 
Or,  
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�𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 − 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜� = 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,                                (6) 
Rearranging, 
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 = 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 + 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,                                    (7) 
Similarly, assuming 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐0𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛  (the updated 
contingency element power flow before the 
contingency) is not observable, it can be written in terms 
of another line flow 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 which is observable. Applying 
equation (7) to equation (4), we get, 
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 =  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0 + 𝛥𝛥𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘0 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘 +
                 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐 �𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0 + 𝛥𝛥𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗0 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑗𝑗�        (8)    
 
Equation (8) allows the estimation of post 
contingency loading on line 𝑙𝑙 for the contingency of 
Line 𝑐𝑐, without the necessity of having updated 
measurements from Lines 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑐𝑐. This provides system 
operators with awareness of the system conditions for 
parts of the system that in not otherwise observable. 
This method is also applicable to reactive-power 
calculations, although the focus here is on real power 
since most line overloads in power systems are caused 
by high real power flow. Pre-calculating LFDFs allows 
a very fast procedure to scan the system for possible 
violations for all possible contingencies. In addition, the 
linear nature of the equations enables performing the 
calculations at synchrophasor rate. Furthermore, the key 
system assumptions are:  
(1) The system model and enough telemetry are 
available to calculate the sensitivity factors. Once the 
factors are calculated, they are assumed to be valid and 
correct as long as the system did not go through a major 
change that affects these factors, such as a significant 
topology change or a major generation profile change. 
This assumption is valid given that those changes are 
monitored and flagged in real-time to trigger the re-
calculation of all sensitivity factors.  
(2) This method applies to single and multiple 
contingencies, given that specific multiple 
contingencies are pre-defined, and the corresponding 
sensitivity factors for the multiple contingencies are pre-
calculated. Therefore, a separate set of sensitivity 
factors are required for multiple outages scenarios. This 
assumption is also valid since system operators are 
interested in monitoring only credible multiple 
contingencies, such as lines sharing transmission 
towers, right of ways, or critical transmission paths.  
(3) The sensitivity factors are calculated with an 
injection of power relatively far from the reference bus, 
to ensure the accuracy of the calculated factors, without 
the slack bus contributing to reverse the flow. An 
example of apply this method is presented in the 
following part of this section.    
Let us consider a modified 5-bus system case, 
where only measurements at buses 1 and 4 are available. 
Also, loads were modified  little to simulate a change 
over time in lines loading. Updated case information is 
presented in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Updated MW flow with Lines only 
connected to substations 1 and 4 
Line l 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
0  𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙  
2-3 57.16 MW Unobservable Contingency 
2-4 52.35 MW 53.67 MW 1.32 MW 
2-5 111.27 MW Unobservable Limiting 
Element 
4-5 16.13 MW 17.20 MW 1.07 MW 
In order to estimate the post-contingency flow on 
Line 2-5 for the contingency of Line 2-3 for example, 
the equation becomes, 
𝑓𝑓2−5,2−3𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 =  𝑓𝑓2−5𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0 + 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓4−5 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2−5,4−5 +
      + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2−5,2−3�𝑓𝑓2−3𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0 +
                                                  𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓2−4 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2−3,2−4�   (9) 
This provides a post contingency estimation of 
128.61 MW for the limiting element 2-5, for the loss of 
the line 2-3. The result can be compared with the 
powerflow simulation result shown below in Figure 3. 
The resulting error in estimation is 0.4%.   
 
 
Figure 3. Simulation of the loss of Line 2-3 on the 
updated 5-bus generic case in Figure 1 
4. Case Study and Simulations 
A case study is presented in this section to evaluate 
and demonstrate the numerical accuracy of the 
proposed methodology. The case uses the IEEE 39 bus 
system, which is reduced from New-England’s power 
system model. This case study illustrates the 
methodology to perform linear security analysis using 
synchrophasor measurements by taking advantage of 
distribution factors to estimate the post contingency 
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flow on transmission equipment where observability is 
not present. To demonstrate the numerical viability of 
this approach, the results are compared to the 
powerflow simulations using PowerWorld Simulator. 
4.1. IEEE 39-Bus System 
The IEEE 39 bus test system is a 10-machine test 
system model that is reduced from New-England Power 
System that has 10 generators and 46 lines [16][17]. A 
one line presentation of the power system model is 
shown in Figure 4 below. PMU observable transmission 
lines and buses are shown in red. Table 3 below shows the 
line loading information for some transmission lines in 
the case, as an example, we will attempt to estimate the 
post-contingency line flows for all lines, following the 
loss of line 2-3.  
 
Figure 4. IEEE 39-Bus System with Limited PMU 
Observability 
PTDFs for all lines relative to the 
injection/withdrawal of power at buses 25 and 9 
respectively are also shown in table 3. Similar to the 
previous exercise, buses 25 and 6 represent the main 
source and sink of the meshed transmission system, 
which in result will derive the highest PTDFs set for all 
major lines. 
Table 3. MW, PTDFs for transaction on buses 25 
and 6 
Line 𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝   % 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃25,6,𝑙𝑙 
2-3 364.72 MW 55.73% 
2-25 231.50 MW 75.78% 
3-18 34.09 MW 2.97% 
17-27 -11.51 MW 24.22% 
26-27 270.44 MW 24.22% 
In order to demonstrate the numerical viability of 
the proposed method, we will attempt to calculate the 
post contingency flow of multiple transmission lines, 
following the loss of the line 2-25. As an example, to 
calculate the post-contingency flow on line 3-18, from 
equation (3) we get, 
𝑓𝑓3−18,2−25 =  𝑓𝑓3−180 +  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃3−18,2−25 𝑓𝑓2−250        (10) 
With a LODF of 73.6%, the estimated post-
contingency line flow of line 3-18 for the contingency 
of line 2-25 is equal to 204.08 MW. This is verified by 
simulation as shown in Figure 5, with an error in 
estimation of 0.6%.  
 
Figure 5. Post-Contingency flow of line 3-18 for the 
loss of line 2-25 
Since both lines are not observable by PMUs, the 
change in pre-contingency line flow with time cannot 
be calculated as the updated flow is not known for 
both lines, due to lack of PMU observability. Using 
equation (8), we can rewrite equation (10) using other 
observable lines k and j, in which equation (10) 
becomes as follows, 
𝑓𝑓3−18,2−25𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 =  𝑓𝑓3−18𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0 + 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃3−18,𝑘𝑘
+ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃3−18,2−25 �𝑓𝑓2−25,𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0
+ 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2−25,𝑗𝑗�                   (11) 
Let us assume that the system state changed a little, 
and the updated flows for the observable lines from table 
3 are shown in table 4. Similar to the previous exercise, 
loads were modified slightly to simulate a change over 




Table 4. Updated MW flow with Lines only 
connected to substations 1 and 4 
Line l 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0  𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
0  𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙  
2-3 364.72 MW 378.4 MW 13.68 MW 
2-25 231.50 MW Unobservable Contingency 
3-18 34.09 MW Unobservable Limiting 
Element 
17-27 -11.51 4.97 MW 16.48 MW 
From Figure 4, selecting line 17-27 as line k, and 
line 2-3 as line j, and substituting in equation (11) we 
get, 
𝑓𝑓3−18,2−25𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 =  𝑓𝑓3−18𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0 +
𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓17−27 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃3−18,17−27 +
                                + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃3−18,2−25�𝑓𝑓2−25𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0  +
                                + 𝛥𝛥 𝑓𝑓2−3 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃2−25,2−3�           (12) 
Equation (12) calculates the Post Contingency 
Line flow of Line 3-18 for the loss of line 2-25 to be 
218.29 MW. Verification using powerflow 
simulations has been performed and provides a post-
contingency flow of 216.83 MW, with a tolerance of 
0.67%, as shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Post-Contingency flow of line 3-18 for the 
loss of line 2-25 
Table 5 presents the Estimation of post 
contingency line flow for the major lines relatively 
close to the observable lines, and demonstrates the 
accuracy of the proposed approach. All the 
estimations are accurate with acceptable tolerances. 
It is worth mentioning that using this approach, a 
security analysis was performed only using a base-
case and two PMUs, to monitor System Operating 
Limits, even for unobservable footprint. Table 5 
shows the transmission lines surrounding the PMU 
observable lines, and other simulation information 
where, 
 
Line l – Transmission Line  
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜
0   – Base-case pre-contingency flows  
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛
0   – Updated base case pre-contingency flows  
LODF – Line Outage Distribution Factor  
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛   (Estimate) – Estimated post-contingency flows  
 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛  (Powerflow) – Actual post-contingency flows  
% Error – Percentage errors in estimation  
 
Table 5. Estimation and accuracy of Post-











LODF %  
𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 
(Estimate)  




2-3 364.72  378.4  88 158.31 158.04 0.17  
2-25 231.50   -100 0 0 0 
3-18 34.09  73.6 218.29 216.83 0.67 
17-18 192.32  73.6 376.52 376.30 0.58 
17-27 -11.51 4.97  100 239.59 245.37 2.36 
25-26   78.61  100 329.71 342.22 3.66 
26-27 270.44  100 521.54 530.75 1.74 
 
With such small system models, the tolerance 
typically is contributed to by the swing bus or the 
boundary buses as the external system is modeled with 
equivalent generators at the boundaries and the slack is 
picked up at the boundaries and at the swing bus. It is 
also noticeable that error percentage increases the 
further away the limiting element or the contingency 
element are from the observable branch that is used for 
the calculation. Therefore, more PMU deployments 
means increased accuracy of the estimations for 
contingency analysis results. 
5. Conclusions  
This paper proposes a methodology to perform 
security analysis using synchrophasor measurements 
and Linear State Estimation technology with limited 
observability on the power grid. This method increases 
the situational awareness of the system, to extend 
beyond the observable footprint of the grid, while 
maintaining a solution at the synchrophasor rate to 
provide visibility of system dynamics. The method 
produces accurate estimations representing the power 
grid following the loss of transmission lines and 
transformers, with a linear solution that solves as fast as 
PMU measurement rate. The accuracy of results 
depends on the validity of the sensitivity factors. 
Therefore, monitoring the system for changes affecting 
the factors to trigger re-calculation of LFDFs is crucial 
to guarantee accurate estimations. This applies to both 
single and multiple contingency definitions. It is also 
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imperative to ensure that the reference bus, in the case 
used to calculate the sensitivity factors, is relatively far 
from the power injection, to ensure accurate calculations 
of these factors. The accuracy of results also depend on 
the PMU coverage of the system. Increase in PMU 
adoption allowing additional measurements across the 
system and leveraging Linear State Estimation to 
provide accurate data and expanded visibility to the 
security analysis, will provide higher accuracy of 
estimations.   
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